We provide an extended dynamic general equilibrium model for investigating decision neutrality of tax systems and apply it in analyzing recent tax reform proposals. The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax (SADIT) and the German Dual Income Tax (GDIT) come under scrutiny. We propose an alternative tax reform which guarantees a higher degree of neutrality without necessarily jeopardizing political feasibility. We show, that all three proposals achieve financial neutrality. In terms of the investment decision and intertemporal effects the proposals differ significantly. * We would like to thank Manfred Rose and Marko Thomas Scholz for fruitful discussions during the conceptual design of a reform proposal discussed in this paper.
Introduction
Economists have been advocating tax systems which assure decision neutrality for quite a long time. Well-known proposals are the "Flat Tax" by Hall and Rabushka (1995) , the "Simple Tax" by Rose (2002) or the proposal by Mitschke (2004) . In contrast to these rather fundamental reforms, recent proposals concentrate on reforming the company and capital income taxation, thereby leaving personal income taxation unchanged in large part. Especially the progressive income tax with maximum rates well above the corporate tax rate seems to be generally accepted as "exogenously" given. I. e. its abolition in favor of a flat rate at the level of the corporate tax rate is politically not feasible, as the progressive income tax provides a broadly accepted instrument of redistribution. Due to international tax competition, on the other hand, a single country cannot afford rising the corporate tax rate too far away from international average. As a third restriction it is politically not feasible to exempt capital income completely from taxation. Accepting these basic conditions there is only a little scope left for changing the tax system towards a higher degree of decision neutrality.
We provide an extended formal model for investigating decision neutrality of tax systems and apply it in analyzing recent tax reform proposals. The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax (SADIT) proposed by Keuschnigg (2004) and the German Dual Income Tax (GDIT), proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts Sachverständigenrat (2006) , come under scrutiny. We propose an alternative tax reform which guarantees a higher degree of neutrality without necessarily jeopardizing political feasibility, as we think.
Relation to the literature
We formulate a neoclassical growth model with taxation in the tradition of Sinn (1987) . Notwithstanding Sinn's approach we do not take Fisher's separation theorem (Fisher, 1930) as a priori given, the consequence of which is that, a priori, there is no well defined market value of a firm to maximize. Instead we directly maximize a representative household's utility function subject to the accumulation process of real as well as financial capital 1 . Sinn's approach applies the net interest as discount rate, which implies a tax system characterized by debt financing not to be inferior to any other source of financing a firm's investment. Our approach serves to question formally whether this condition is satisfied. From this point of view our model can be used to prove the adaptability of Fisher's separation theorem. Furthermore, our approach enables us to distinguish between two levels of personal capital income taxation: taxation at the time of realization and at the time of consumptive usage. We will need this distinction to analyze our reform
proposal.
Basic model
We consider a closed economy with competitive markets and with identical infinitely living individuals. For the sake of simplicity, the number of individuals at date t ≥ 0 is constant over time, and the labor supply is fully inelastic and at each date given by L. In our basic model, there is a representative household that owns a representative firm. Per capita consumption is a flow c of units of a single good. The representative household evaluates the flow of consumption it can enjoy after a certain point in time t in terms of the utility function
Thereby U (c) is a twice differentiable, strictly concave and monotonically increasing function indicating the instantaneous felicity. The parameter ρ > 0 represents a subjective rate of discount. The firm's production of a homogeneous good is assumed to depend on the level of real capital K and labor L, according to a neoclassically well-behaved production function f (K, L). We also assume the Inada conditions to hold. 2 Economic depreciation of real capital is a fixed fraction δ > 0 of the stock K.
The household's stream of gross savings, labeled b Q , flow to an account at a financial intermediary. The household decides whether to invest part of the resources held at the account into the firm via injections of new equity, labeled b K , or to leave resources as a bank deposit. The stock of savings deposit, held at the financial intermediary, is labeled Q. Financial assets bear interest at rate r, i.e. the stock Q yields rQ. The household can also decide to withdraw resources from the account for consumption. The corresponding flow variable is denoted by a Q .
The firm takes out loans of size d from the financial intermediary. The outstanding stock of debt we denote by D. As a third way of finance the firm can retain profits, denoted by p. The amount of dividends distributed from the firm (in terms of real assets) to the bank account is given as the residual
For we assume the interest rate on loans to equal the rate on deposits, the financial intermediary does not make any profits.
The household earns labor income wL, where w denotes the wage rate. Hence, in our model, consumption is financed by labor income and by withdrawals from the account, a Q . As consumption based tax systems may distinguish between distributed profits that are reinvested and those that are consumed, we have to interpose the bank account level, Q, to allow for this distinction. Thus we can distinguish three levels of taxation, too:
company taxation, capital income taxation at the time of realization, and taxation at the time of consumption.
These preliminaries settled, the representative household maximizes (1) subject to three equations of motionK
the budgetary constraint of the household
and the non-negativity conditions a After substituting for a K according to (2), the resulting current-value Hamiltonian to maximize is given by:
From the first-order conditions, i. e.
∂H ∂x
= 0 concerning a control variable
, and
And from the transversality conditions 3 we finally obtain
Combining (9) and (10) we find that, in the optimum, β Q = −α Q = 0 holds, as the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers cannot reach negative values. I. e. the household is indifferent between making a further bank deposit, b Q , and retaining means within the bank account by reducing the withdrawal for consumption, a Q .
The financial decision of the firm
The financial decision of the firm is part of the optimal choice of control variables from the household's perspective. If one of the financial instruments (b K , p or d) implies a lower utility than another, it is necessary that the firm will make no use of it in the optimum.
contradicts the Kuhn-Tucker condition β K ≥ 0. Thus, α K = 0 must hold. Now it follows from (11) and (12) that β K = γ, which can be interpreted as an indifference between the two types of equity finance.
To test for full financial neutrality we now check the solution β K = γ = σ = 0. As (12) and (13) consistently yield µ
As this must be true for all t,μ Q =μ D holds as well. Inserting this into (16), applying α K = 0 again, shows that (16) is equivalent to (15). Thus-given there exists one at all-we found a solution, for which β K = γ = σ = 0 holds.
We conclude that the way of financing the firm's investment has no effect on the utility function and that financial neutrality holds in the tax free world. Thus our model confirms the well-known neutrality result obtained by Modigliani and Miller (1958) .
Investment neutrality
As combining (14) with (15) or (16), respectively, yields the well-known result that, in the optimum, the cost of capital equals the market rate of interest:
From the household's perspective, (18) states the no arbitrage condition that the yield of the marginal investment into the firm's stock of real capital equals the yield of lending to the financial intermediary, r.
Economic interpretation
To interpret the shadow prices it is convenient to start at the consumption level, i. e. with the Lagrange multiplier λ. As (8) states, it simply measures the marginal instantaneous felicity of a further (marginal) unit of consumption, c, evaluated at optimally chosen investment and consumption paths. Thus λ measures the increase in utility at time t given by (1) due to a marginal increase in consumption at that time. The costate variable µ Q is the shadow price of a further asset, held within the bank account from time t, and states the so induced utility surplus, evaluated at t. 5 In the model without taxes it equals the shadow price of a further unit of consumption, λ, as assets can be transformed into consumption goods one-to-one by simply withdrawing money from the bank account. A tax system, on the contrary, can drive a wedge between the two shadow prices, as we will see later. A further or alternative wedge may exist between the shadow price of real capital, µ K , and the shadow price of a further asset within the bank account, µ Q . Thereby µ K measures the utility surplus brought about by a further (marginal) unit of real capital, employed in the firm from time t, again evaluated at that time and after having optimally chosen all control variables. 6 As we have seen, without taxes the two shadow prices are equal.
The result µ Q = µ K = −µ D is economically plausible: A further unit of bank deposits bears interest earnings r at every point in time after the increase. The same is true for a further unit of real capital, yielding r, as investment neutrality prevails. Interest paid on a further unit of debt cut the firm's profit, thereby reducing dividend payments to the bank account at the amount of r from the time of borrowing. Thus the changes in the stocks of bank deposit, real capital and debt at time t, effect the utility function (1) in the same way; the former two with a positive, the latter with a negative algebraic sign.
Introducing taxes
We will now incorporate different taxes into the basic model. As it offers different levelsthe consumption level, the bank deposit and the firm-we will be able to depict different tax systems which have recently been discussed. In this section we lay out the general model with taxation. 
Taxation on the personal level
Q = θ r rQ + b Q − a Q −θ a b K + θ a a K (19) θ w wL + θ c a Q = c + b Q(20)
Company taxation
First of all a tax base has to be defined. To allow for a broad amount of company tax regimes, two further parameters, α 1 and α 2 , are introduced. The former is well-known from Sinn (1987) and stands for accelerated tax depreciation, while the latter allows for a full or partial deduction of equity costs. The general tax base reads as follows:
All company tax regimes considered in this paper allow for a deduction of labor costs as well as interest payments to the creditor. Depending on the details of the corresponding tax law, the tax deductible write off may lead to a higher present value than the true economic depreciation of the capital stock, as given by δ. This difference is captured by α 1 . Thus tax depreciation is modeled by continuous economic depreciation, δ, plus an immediate write off, α 1 . If the tax system allows for corporate equity, the relevant base is given by the tax written down value of capital, (1 − α 1 )K, reduced by the stock of outstanding debt, D.
Our basic model is affected by company taxation only through (2), which now changes to
As (3) stays unchanged in the presence of taxation, (22) can be expressed as
Tax revenue
As we are interested in the economic efficiency of different tax systems, we have to rule out income effects. This can be done by rebating the tax revenue as lump-sum transfers to the representative household. I. e. the utility maximizing household does not anticipate that a higher tax payment leads to higher transfers. Thus, from the household's perspective, the lump-sum transfers do not depend on any variable he has to determine, directly or indirectly. To save on notation we omit these transfers.
This way of ruling out income effects is well-known in the public finance literature. For example Ahlheim and Rose (1992) use it in a static context and Sinn (1987) in a dynamic one. In contrast to Sinn (1987) , who allows the state to postpone a transfer at the cost of interest added to the later payment, in our model the state rebates all revenue instantaneously.
Optimization in the presence of taxation
With taxation (4), (6) and (2) have to be replaced by (19), (20) and (23), respectively.
This leads to a new Hamiltonian to maximize, subject to the corresponding constraints:
As first-order conditions we obtain:
The transversality condition (17) must hold in an optimum as well.
These formulae serve as tools for the following analysis of different tax reform proposals.
They are not interpreted here in this general form. Nevertheless one observation should be mentioned, namely that the deviation of tax depreciation from economic depreciation affects all three financial instruments of the firm, b K , p and d, in exactly the same way.
This can be seen from the last summand in (28), (29) and (30), respectively. I.e. if a tax system lacks financial neutrality, this is not due to its particular rules of tax write off. In fact such an a-neutrality is due to an inappropriate choice of tax rates.
Some methodological remarks
In our approach we do not assume Fisher's Separation Theorem (Fisher, 1930) to hold a priori. This theorem states that utility maximization implies the maximization of the representative firm's market value. Thereby the market value is determined by the present value of all future cash flows net of tax between the firm and its shareholders. To calculate the present value, the interest rate net of tax is employed as discount rate.
The economic reasoning underlying this approach is that the market value quotes how much capital would have to be alternatively deposited today in a bank account, yielding interest income, in order to generate the same future net cash flows. However, this premises that the alleged alternative investment in financial assets actually is a good alternative, assuming rational behavior of the investor. Suppose, for example, the corporate tax rate falls short of the personal tax rate levied on interest income. To keep things simple there be no further taxes on dividends and capital gains. Of course, in such a scenario, it would be rational to invest as much real capital until the difference between its marginal product and the pre-tax interest rate exactly compensates the tax wedge.
But if we allow for granting loans at the company level, the marginal gross product of an investment into the firm will never fall short of the pre-tax interest rate. In such a case the investor is capable of a better alternative than a bank deposit on his private account.
Thus, in such a case it can hardly be justified to employ the interest rate net of personal tax as the right discount rate to determine the market value.
Although not in line with reality, in our general model we exclude granting loans at the company level, as we require d ≥ 0. Why we need this restriction becomes more apparent, when we close the model. Then savings have to match debt, Q = D. If d = 0 is binding, σ > 0 holds necessarily. Giving up the restriction would result in the firm to become a net supplier of debt capital. In a market equilibrium this would imply the household to borrow from the firm. In the simple example from above this would imply, that the tax system allows for tax deduction of interest payed on private credits at a higher rate than the firm has to tax its yields. Of course this implies arbitrage for every positive interest rate and no finite equilibrium D = Q will exist. In such a case d ≥ 0 generates a "synthetic" equilibrium D = Q = 0, if we assume D = 0 as initial value. We do not try to interpret this case, which would degenerate our model in large parts. We rather use the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multiplier γ to question whether a capital market with a well defined interest rate r exists.
Summing up, if σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions, the non-negativity constraint d ≥ 0 is not binding, i. e. a firm's investment is debt financed or at least could be so without decreasing utility. In this case a capital market exists when we close the model. To deposit capital in a bank account yielding net interest is a possible alternative to an investment into the firm, restricting the net return of the latter not to fall below the net interest rate. Thus net interest serves as discount rate to determine the firm's market value. On the other hand, σ > 0 indicates that there exists no capital market in the closed model. In such a case we are not able to define a market value of the firm.
Our approach allows for a third level of taxation, namely to tax withdrawals from bank accounts which are used for consumption. It enables us to analyze the financial decision of a firm in a tax system applying this level of taxation. Furthermore, if it turns out that σ = 0 holds in such a tax system, we can find a well defined discount rate and, thus, the market value of the firm.
To conclude, in initially forgoing Fisher's separation theorem our approach serves to verify its applicability in our setting.
Analysis of different tax systems
In the stress field of international tax competition, which affects capital stronger than labor as the less mobile input factor, on the one hand, and budget deficits on the other, several reform proposals of the last few years combine a moderate capital income tax with a corporate tax, thereby maintaining the existing progressive income tax on wages. Here, three proposals of that kind are analyzed using the model of the previous section.
The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax
The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax (SADIT) has been proposed by Christian Keuschnigg in 2004. The corporate income tax allows for a notional interest on corporate equity. The notional interest rate matches the "normal return" in the amount of the market interest rate r. In contrast to a pure consumption-based tax system, the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) is combined with a personal tax on capital income, which comprises returns on interest, dividend payments and capital gains. Interest yields are taxed at the constant rate τ r , while dividends and capital gains are taxed at a dynamic rate τ a , in order to compensate for the tax free accumulation of normal returns in the firm. The latter increases in time t, beginning at the time of share purchase t 1 :
The tax base is the dividend payment or the realization receipts, respectively. Observe that, in the latter case, purchase costs are not deductible. Assuming efficient capital markets, Auerbach and Bradford (2004) show this tax formula to be equivalent to a cash − f low tax at rate
with t representing a particular calendar date, which is not associated with the date of purchase. It rather applies to all dividends and realization receipts, independent of the underlying share's purchase date. As is inherent to a cash-flow tax, the share purchase at date t 1 , provides a deduction at rate τ a = 1 − e −τ r rt 1 . The same is true for the injection of new equity into the firm. Without affecting the functioning of the dynamic tax rate, namely the compensation for the tax free accumulation of normal returns in the firm, the starting point t can be set to zero.
In our model we use the second variant of the dynamic tax rate, i. e. the cash-flow version.
As this implies a deduction of new equity, β K , from the capital income tax base at the time of insertion, we have to setθ a = θ a . We account for the ACE system on the company level by setting α 2 = 1. The conclusions derived from the first-order conditions in the general model reduce to:
For the same reasons as in the model without taxes, Comparing (40) and (41) 
set γ = σ = 0. Differentiation with respect to time t yields
Differentiating θ a according to (35) , to capture the change in the dynamic tax factor, and substituting forμ Q and −μ D according to (43) and (44), respectively, finally yields
As (46) shows, (β K =)γ = σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions. Hence the tax system is neutral with respect to the financial decision of the firm.
To get the economic intuition of the result we pick up the interpretation of shadow prices given in the model without taxes. A once and for all reduction of one unit of outstanding debt reduces interest payments from that time. Ceteris paribus this leads to a permanent increase in dividend payments, which are given as a residual according to (23), in the amount of r. In contrast to the tax free world, only the amount net of dividend tax reaches the bank account, i.e. θ a r. Remember that θ a decreases monotonically as time elapses, starting at one in t = 0 and converging to zero as time goes to infinity. A once and for all increase in Q, on the other hand, leads to a permanent increase in interest yields, which are taxed at the time they accrue at rate τ r . As the interest tax rate is constant over time, the dividend tax rate falls short of it in a first period of time and exceeds it afterwards. For given before tax cash flows this implies a higher net income during this first period in the case of dividends. This tax induced surplus augments the bank account and yields interest income. By construction the increase in the dividend tax rate exactly offsets this advantage. Starting at t = 0, which implies a dividend tax rate of zero, the shadow prices under consideration, −µ D and µ Q , are equal. At every later point in time the dividend tax rate drives a wedge between them. This is due to the fact, that the reduction in the stock of debt is assumed to be exogenous, to be in line with the interpretation of shadow prices, rather than preceded by a tax deductible insertion of equity. It thus bears the very tax burden accrued from t = 0 until that time as retained profits. But observe that this is only a level effect and constitutes no incentives for further retaining profits or substituting equity for debt.
To see this algebraically take a look at the present value of the tax induced difference in the net income at time t. As discount rate we use the interest rate net of tax, which is justified as γ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions. The present value at time t
Inserting the formula of the dynamic dividend tax rate according to (35) we receive
As claimed above the present value of the tax induced difference in interest and dividend income, given equal before-tax cash flows, is determined by the dividend tax rate at the time of the respective exogenous once and for all changes in debt and bank deposits. As a special case the tax rate and thus the difference in net income vanishes if t = 0.
By now it is clear that it makes no difference how a firm's investment is financed. Next we ask how much is optimally invested, given the gross interest rate r. First observe that from (39) and in use of α K = β K = 0 we get
Differentiation and substituting forμ Q /µ Q according to (43) yieldṡ
As a next step we slightly rearrange (42) and substitute for µ Q according to (49)
Using (50) to get rid of µ K finally yields
which is equivalent to f K (K, L) − δ = r. This is the well known result from the optimization problem in the tax free world, as (18) documents. I. e., given the gross interest rate, the optimal investment of the firm is the same as without taxation. Thus the tax system does not distort the investment decision of the firm. Observe that this is true for any α 1 , i. e. it does not rely on any specific tax write-off. To put it differently, the depreciation rules of the tax code do not affect the pre-tax return of the marginal investment and thus the optimally chosen capital stock, given r. This is a well known result of a pure ACE tax system and, as has just been shown, stays true for the combined tax system of the SADIT. To sum up, the SADIT neither distorts the financial nor the investment decision of the firm. Whether the intertemporal allocation is affected will be examined later on.
The German Dual Income Tax
In 2006 the German Council of Economic Experts proposed a Dual Income Tax for Germany (Sachverständigenrat, 2006) . It largely corresponds to the Norwegian Dual Income
Tax after the introduction of the Shareholder Income Tax in 2002. 7 Among other things the reform proposal aims at a tax system that ensures financial neutrality. The German Dual Income Tax (GDIT) formally treats corporations and non-incorporated firms differently. We begin with a brief description of the case of corporations and argue that the tax system affects non-incorporated firms equivalently from an economic point of view.
GDIT and corporations
Basically the Council's proposal leaves the corporate tax base as it is, but proposes several changes within the personal income tax. All kinds of capital income, i.e. dividends, capital gains and interest yields, are taxed at a rate which significantly falls short of the maximum rate levied on labor income. The main difference to the current tax system is an indexing of an asset's purchase price or the insertion of new equity into a firm at the personal income tax level. The indexing rate equals the market rate of interest net of tax. Thus dividends and capital gains are effectively not taxed until this imputation capacity is exhausted.
In the following analysis we again confine to insertions of new equity and receipts of dividends. Assume an insertion at time t 1 which gives rise to a dividend payment at t 2 that is high enough to exhaust the imputation induced by the insertion. An insertion of b K in t 1 leads to an amount of [τ a b K e θ r r(t 2 −t 1 ) ], which can be offset against the dividend tax in t 2 . If we use net interest 8 as discount rate, an assumption to be justified later on, the present value of this imputation at any point in time t is given by
As (53) reveals, the present value of an insertion's imputation capacity is independent of the particular date it is offset against dividend tax. Apart from its reference date t, it solely depends on the time of insertion. Thus the present value of an imputation capacity induced by an insertion b K and valued at the time of insertion is just τ a b K , irrespective of the time it is actually offset. 9 It should be clear that in present value terms it would be equivalent to induce a cash flow tax comprising an asset's purchase price and insertions on the one hand as well as realization receipts and dividends on the other hand, rather than to index an asset's purchase price and insertions of new equity until they can be offset against realization receipts or dividends. 10 We employ this equivalence by setting
Furthermore the GDIT for corporations can be represented by setting the following tax parameters. The interest tax rate equals the dividend tax rate and also meets the corporate tax rate, τ r = τ a = τ G . In order to see how essential this equality is, we start our analysis with a separate parameter for each tax and equalize them after the optimization. As has just been argued, the future imputation induced by an insertion b K has a present value of τ a b K at the time of insertion (θ a = θ a ). On the company level there is no allowance for corporate equity, thus α 2 = 0.
The first-order conditions of the general model now yield:
8 For the sake of simplicity we hold r constant. Nothing essential hinges on this assumption.
9 The assumption, that the imputation capacity is exhausted by one dividend payment at one point in time (t 2 ), is not restrictive, as we could split the insertion and assign each fraction to an adequate dividend payment at different points in time.
c : λ = U (c) (54)
Analog to the derivation in the SADIT-case we conclude α Q = β Q = 0 from (55) and (56) as well as α K = 0 and γ = β K from (57) and (58). Again,θ a = θ a is crucial for the latter results.
Testing for γ = β K = σ = 0 yields θ a µ Q = −µ D and differentiation with respect to time
Substituting forμ D and µ D in (62) reveals, that this is in line with (61) only if θ r = θ G , which holds according to the tax rates proposed by the Council. Thus financial neutrality holds. Interestingly, this would also be true for any other dividend tax rate τ a = τ r , thus it is not necessary to set τ a = τ r . However, the neutrality result requires θ r r to be the rate of indexing the purchase price. That θ r r is the right discount rate is justified, as σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions.
We now analyze the investment decision of the firm, given r. From (57) and in use of
Differentiation and substituting forμ Q /µ Q according to (61) yieldṡ
We substitute for θ a µ Q according to (63) and obtain from (60) after some rearrangemenṫ
Equating (64) and (65) yields
or equivalently, using
As (67) shows, the capital cost depend on the regime of tax write-off. Only in the special case of true economic depreciation (α 1 = 0) investment neutrality prevails, which is a statement of the well-known Johansson-Samuelson theorem 11 .
GDIT and non-corporate firms
The previous section dealt with the taxation of a corporate firm. As already mentioned the GDIT taxes non-corporate firms quite differently. But, as will be shown, the two ways yield equivalent economic results-at least under the stylized assumptions of the model.
The relevant parameters are as follows: τ r stays unchanged, there is no tax on the withdrawals from the firm, τ a non−corporate = 0, and the firms return is taxed at the personal tax rate τ p , which we assume to be at the top level of the progressive tariff, i. e.
The tax rates are well-chosen such that θ p = θ G θ a . At the firm level there is a partial allowance for equity capital. As in an ACE system, the stock of equity net of tax write-offs is the relevant quantity. In contrast to a pure ACE the tax rate levied on the imputed interest on equity at the firm level is not zero, but matches the tax rate on interest income τ r . We translate this partial allowance into the model by setting
Observe that, as the tax base is reduced by α 2 r per unit of tax-written down equity capital, this choice of α 2 implies a tax levied on a normal return r
which justifies the choice of α 2 .
With α K = 0, which holds for the same reason as in the case of corporate firms, and
A look back to (33) reveals that with θ a = 1 and (68)
is the relevant equation of motion for µ D in an optimum. As µ Q = −µ D , this is in line with (61), which holds both for the corporate and the non-corporate firm under the GDIT.
Thus financial neutrality also holds in the non-corporate case.
To analyze the investment decision of the firm we apply (31) using the respective parameters for the non-corporate case of the GDIT. As equation of motion for µ K in an optimum we get
As in the case of a corporate firm, but with θ a = 1, we can derive
From (71) and (72) we conclude
the left-hand-side of (73) equals ρ − θ r r, as we know from (65), which also holds in the non-corporate case. Using this information and rearranging (73) yields
This is exactly the same result as in the corporate case, remembering that τ
Summing up the GDIT treats corporations and non-corporate firms quite differently in a formal sense. Nevertheless the economic impact of the two variants is equivalent as far as the financial decision and the marginal investment is concerned. If we assume τ p to be at the top level of the progressive tariff and remember that τ a and τ 
An alternative ACE proposal
A further proposal for the integrated reform of company and capital income taxation consists of an ACE on company level combined with a modified capital income tax on the personal level, which leaves capital income untaxed until it is withdrawn for the purpose of consumption. While the ACE is a well known component of several reform proposals, as the SADIT for example, the implementation of a usage dependent capital income taxation requires some explanation.
A crucial element of the proposal is the introduction of so called Qualif ied Bank Accounts (QBA). A QBA comprises a savings account as well as a custody account as sub-accounts.
For the sake of simplicity assume that every financial transaction made by an individual, in particular the insertion of new equity into the firm, is processed using such a QBA.
Furthermore every share be hold within the custody sub-account, which ensures dividends to flow into the QBA when distributed. In principle there are four possible inflows to the QBK: new savings, dividends distributed by the firm, capital gains from share transfers and interest on the current stock of savings. None of these inflows is subject to capital income taxation.New savings are not tax deductible, which would be the case in an S-base cash-flow tax. Possible outflows are insertions of new equity into the firm and withdrawals for consumption. Only the latter is subject to capital income taxation. Thus there is an asymmetry between taxable withdrawals and non-deductible new savings.
As the QBA implies zero taxes levied on interest income accumulated within the account and dividends payed into the account, the corresponding tax parameters in the model vanish, i.e. τ r = τ a = 0. Withdrawals from the QBA are taxed at τ c > 0. On the company level the ACE implies α 2 = 1. The conclusions derived from the first-order conditions in the general model with taxation now reduce to:
The tax on withdrawals from the bank account potentially drives a wedge between the shadow price of bank deposits, µ Q , and the shadow price of consumption, λ. This depends on the value of β Q . From (76) and (77) we have: 
and one of withdrawing (a Q > 0, α Q = 0). How these possible phases interact and in which way they affect the path of capital accumulation will be analyzed later on. In this section we concentrate on the tax system's intratemporal efficiency, i.e. financial and investment neutrality.
As the QBA ensures that no cash-flow is subject to personal capital income taxation until it is withdrawn for consumption, no tax factor enters (78), (79) and (80). Thus these equations do not differ from their counterparts in the tax free world. Consequently the same arguments as there yield α K and let β K = γ = σ = 0 be in line with the firdtorder conditions. Thus the financial decision of the firm is not altered by the tax system.
Furthermore the shadow prices of bank deposits and the reduction of debt, µ Q and −µ D , respectively, are equal. They differ from the shadow price of real capital, µ K , only by the constant factor (1 − α 1 τ G ) and thus change at the same rate,μ
Using (81) and (82) leads to
which is equivalent to f K (K, L)−δ = r and guarantees investment neutrality. This, again, is true independent of the depreciation parameter α 1 . To summarize, combining an ACE at the company level with a QBA described above preserves the well-known intratemporal neutrality results of a pure consumption-based tax system. To be more precisely it neither distorts the investment and financial decision of a firm, nor does the investment decision depend on the tangible depreciation rules given by tax law. As far as intratemporal efficiency is concerned, this proposal does not differ from the SADIT. However, it is attained in quite a different way. The SADIT, on the one hand, basically adheres to taxing capital income, in particular interest yields, when it accrues. It counterbalances the relative advantage of an ACE tax base, namely to accumulate normal returns tax free on the company level, by adequately increasing the tax rate levied on dividends and capital gains. The current proposal, on the other hand, countervails the relative disadvantage of taxing interest yields, compared to an ACE tax base on the company level. Thus a Qualified Bank Account is primarily employed in order to leave interest yields tax exempt as long as they are accumulated, just as normal returns on assets at the company level are treated given an ACE tax base. As a further function QBAs prevent lock-in effects, which would arise if the reallocation of capital from one firm to another would inevitably be charged with a tax.
Taxation and economic growth
In this section we address the question whether the introduced tax systems affect economic growth. For this purpose we have to endogenize the factor prize paths, i. e. the interest rate r and the wage rate w, such that the factor markets clear. As we assumed inelastic labor supply given by L and competitive factor markets the wage rate is determined by the marginal product of labor,
As financial neutrality holds for all of the described tax systems, we can assume without loss of generality, that the firm's real capital is completely debt financed. In the closed economy debt has to equal savings.
Taken together Q = D = K always holds. From the demand side of the capital market we have
with P K = 1 in the case of investment neutrality, which we have shown to hold both for the SADIT and for our ACE proposal, and P K = 1 − α 1 τ r in the case of the GDIT. The supply side is in the generally driven by (25), (27) and (32). With dU (c)/dt = U (c)ċ we obtain after a few steps
Equating (86) and (88) yieldsμ
As tax revenue is rebated to the household as a lump-sum transfer, the whole production net of economic depreciation, f (K, L) − δK is either consumed or invested. Thus we obtain a further equation of motioṅ
which holds in an intertemporal market equilibrium.
SADIT, GDIT and Growth
As has been shown above, β Q = 0 holds for all t both for the SADIT and the GDIT. Thus (87) and (89) can be equated, yielding
The dynamic system described by (90) and (91) yields paths c(t) and K(t), which are well-defined and unique for given initial values c(0) and K(0). 12 As we know from the analysis of Sinn (1987, p. 245 ) for a given initial value K(0) there is only one path leading (or rather converging) to a steady state, called stable path. Furthermore, the stable path is the only one that is compatible with th idea of a market equilibrium. 13 To put it differently, given K(0) and the path of r(t) that is compatible with the stable path, the maximizing household, who regards r(t) as exogenously given, choses the initial value of the control variable c(0) such that (K(0), c(0)) actually lies on the stable path.
In the following we restrict the analysis to the properties of the steady state, wherė c =K = 0 must hold. From (91) we then obtain
Observe that, as This ensures that the transversality condition given by (17) is satisfied. The steady state is affected by taxation only through
Without taxation,
, L) − δ has to be greater than in the absence of taxation. The properties of f (K, L) imply a lower steady state level of capital then. For the SADIT this is definitely the case, as investment neutrality implies P K = 1 and τ r > 0. The steady state level of the capital stock implied by the GDIT depends on the value of α 1 , i. e. the rules of tax write-off. In the extreme case of immediate write-off, α 1 = 1 holds and thus
θ r = 1, which implies the same steady state capital stock as with no taxation. Of course, α 1 = 1 is in general not satisfied, especially not for the German rules of tax depreciation. With α 1 < 1 the capital stock falls short of the one without taxation. We can conclude that neither the SADIT nor the GDIT leave the steady state allocation of capital undistorted. Both tax systems are not neutral with respect to economic growth.
13 Cf. Sinn (1987, p. 377ff) 6.2 Growth effects of the alternative ACE proposal
As we have seen in 5.4, we can distinguish three different possible phases. We will concentrate on the one that is relevant in the neighborhood of the steady state. As in a steady stateK = 0 holds by definition, no further capital is accumulated. Consequently all kinds of capital income are paid to the QBA, be it in the form of distributed profits or interest income, and no capital is retained or inserted into the firm (p = b K = 0). With Q = K we immediately conclude thatQ =K = 0 holds in the steady state as well. No cash flow from the QBA to the firm on the one hand and a constant QBA stock on the other, implies positive withdrawals for consumptive usage in a steady state, a Q > 0, and thus α Q = 0. Now imagine we are below the steady state capital stock. The closer we are to the steady state, the smaller isK. If we are sufficiently close we can be sure, that there is more capital income than will be reinvested. Thus in a neighborhood of the steady state the same arguments as in the steady state imply α Q = 0 or equivalently β Q = τ c λ.
Now (87) reduces to
which can be equated to (89). With θ r = 1 we conclude that
holds in a neighborhood of the steady state. 14 As (94) is equivalent to the the case without taxation, the growth path in a neighborhood of the steady state is not altered by the tax system. Obviously
must hold in the steady state, which matches the steady state condition without taxation.
This neutrality result implies by no means, that the whole path of capital accumulation is undistorted by the tax system.
Conclusion
We introduced an extended dynamic general equilibrium model for investigating decision neutrality of tax systems. In the formal model non-negativity constraints play a crucial role in checking for financial neutrality and in analyzing growth effects. We applied the model in analyzing recent tax reform proposals, namely the Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax, the German Dual Income Tax as well as an alternative proposal based on an ACE at the company level combined with so called Qualified Bank Accounts. All of the three proposals have in common, that they accept several exogenous restrictions. In particular the abolition of the progressive income tax in favor of a flat rate and a purely consumption-based tax seem to be politically not feasible. At the same time international tax competition imposes pressure upon the corporate tax rate.
As our analysis has shown, in all of the three tax systems financial neutrality prevails. In addition, the SADIT and our alternative ACE proposal are investment neutral. I. e. given the interest rate, the capital stock is not altered compared to the tax free world. This is true for all regimes of tax write-off. In contrast, the GDIT is not investment neutral, except for the special case, that the tax write-off exactly meets economic depreciation.
In general this is hardly the case for real life depreciation rules. We also investigated the intertemporal implications of the tax systems. While the SADIT and the GDIT are not neutral in this respect, the alternative ACE proposal ensures at least an undistorted steady state level of the capital stock. On the basis of our model we argued that the neutrality result even holds within a neighborhood of the steady state. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded, that our proposal leaves the whole path of capital accumulation undistorted.
A Appendix: Transversality Condition
We prove the transversality condition concerning µ Q as part of the necessary conditions of an optimum. Assume Q * (t) to meet the other first order conditions. The two control variables a Q ≥ 0 and b Q ≥ 0 make it possible to find admissible smooth paths Q 1 and Q 2 , such that Q 1 (t) > Q * (t) and Q 2 (t) < Q * (t), ∀t > t 1 , for some t 1 ≥ 0, and Q 1 (t) = Q 2 (t) = Q * (t), ∀t ≤ t 1 . Of course, paths between Q 1 and Q 2 are admissible, too. Thus we can be sure to find a smooth function η(t), η(t) = 0 ∀t ≤ t 1 and η(t) > 0 ∀t > t 1 , such that Q(t, ξ) := Q * (t) + ξη(t)
is admissible in a neighborhood of ξ = 0 and for which Q(t, 0) := Q * (t) holds ∀t. By construction (96) defines an admissible variation of Q(t), which neither varies K(t) nor D(t), as these paths are not affected by a Q and b Q . Thus we found a function η := (η, 0, 0)
and a one-parameter family (Q, K, D)(t, ξ) = (Q * , K * , D * )(t) + ξη
with X * denoting a path of the state variable X = Q, K, D, which meets the other first order conditions.
We can now apply a general formulation of transversality conditions for infinite horizon problems with free boundaries for each state variable, which states that the product of the vector of costate variables (in present values) and the vector of any admissible variation in the state variables, i. e. any admissible η, must vanish as time goes to infinity (Hadley and Kemp, 1973, p. 225, p. 292 
